DNS and domain controls auditors overlook: DNSSEC, registrar lock and nameserver redundancy
The domain itself is an asset. How to check it is owned, protected and resilient.
The single point of failure nobody registers
Website, email, single sign-on and most SaaS integrations depend on one domain name. If it expires, is transferred away or has its DNS changed by an attacker, all of them fail at once. Yet the domain rarely appears on the asset register or the supplier list.
Ownership and the registrar
- Expiry: the registration should run well ahead, with auto-renew on and a payment method that won’t lapse.
- Transfer lock: clientTransferProhibited should be set, so the domain can’t be moved to another registrar without an extra step.
- Registrar account: who holds the login, and is it protected with multi-factor authentication? Ask; it can’t be seen from outside.
- Registrant: is the domain held by the organisation, or by a former employee or agency?
DNS integrity: DNSSEC and CAA
DNSSEC signs DNS answers so resolvers can detect forged ones. Check that the chain of trust is complete from the top-level domain down; a broken chain is worse than none, because validating resolvers will refuse the domain.
CAA records name the certificate authorities allowed to issue certificates for the domain.
Resilience
- At least two nameservers, ideally on different networks or providers.
- Every nameserver answers with the same serial: a mismatch means updates aren’t reaching all of them.
- Changes reach resolvers worldwide: a propagation check from several regions confirms it.
Mapping
ISO 27001:2022: A.5.9 inventory (the domain is an asset), A.5.19 supplier relationships (registrar and DNS host), A.8.14 redundancy (nameservers), A.8.24 cryptography (DNSSEC). NIST CSF 2.0: ID.AM-02 and PR.IR-03.
This maps what we can see from the internet to common controls, to help you gather evidence. It isn’t a certification, an audit opinion or legal advice. Your auditor, your scope and your Statement of Applicability decide what applies.